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juror to answer the questions "yes," the juror might be disqualified.
The life/death qualification of a juror to sit in a capital case is a
federal constitutional question.
Counsel for capital defendants also should continue to ask
questions similar to Buchanan's first question regarding pretrial
publicity. Trial courts routinely ask jurors if they can set aside any
impressions or opinions received of the case formed before trial. This
question, however, leaves out a logical step: determining whether the
juror has any specific impressions to set aside and what they are. The
right to a fair and impartial jury is also a federal constitutional
question.
Defense counsel also should continue to request individual
sequestered voir dire, additional peremptory challenges, and
meaningful, non-leading voir dire. Many trial judges will and have
exercised their discretion to grant these requests. Counsel should
continue to tie these requests to the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution's guarantee of the right to a fair and impartial jury
and to Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976), as did
Buchanan. Woodson held that due process requires a greater degree
of reliability in a process that can determine death as an appropriate
punishment. This has been termed "super due process." The United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged this principle recently by
suggesting that special capital procedures are available only at trial
and on direct appeal. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1989) (see discussion of Giarratano, this issue). Since the
trial jury is the life/death decision maker, more Sixth Amendment
procedures are arguably required to ensure reliability.
Individually, none of the objections based on jury selection
procedures is particularly strong in the constitutional sense. The
combined effect of all the things Buchanan complained about,
however, could amount to a denial of due process. For instance, if the
trial court denies defense counsel's motions for individual seques-
tered voir dire, meaningful, non-leading voir dire, additional
peremptory challenges, change of venue, and others, the combined
effect might well be that the defendant is not tried by a lawfully
constituted, impartial jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Accordingly, defense counsel should object to the jury selection
process as a whole, and tie this larger objection to federal law as
described above. While individual jury selection problems may not
result in an eventual reversal, a combined objection may.
It should also be remembered that objections to the qualifica-
tions of prospective jurors or limitations on examination of a
particular prospective juror must be restated at the time the juror is
about to be seated. Valid objections which counsel made during voir
dire are lost if not renewed when the jury is seated. In addition,
counsel should note which jurors counsel would challenge if
additional peremptory challenges were granted. Only in this way will
questionable jury selection procedures be preserved for appeal.
Summary and analysis by: Diane U. Montgomery
HOKE v. COMMONWEALTH
237 Va. 303,377 S.E.2d 595 (1989)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Ronald Lee Hoke, Sr., was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of rape, robbery, and abduction. On October 7, 1985 the
police found Virginia C. Stell's body in her apartment. Stell had been
stabbed twice. A medical examiner expressed belief that Stell "had
some period of time of survival, at least several minutes." Her arms
bore severe bruises. Stell was tightly bound with electrical cords.
Evidence indicated Stell had been penetrated vaginally and anally.
Semen matching Hoke's blood type was found on sheets and a
bedspread in Stell's bedroom.
On October 15, 1985, Hoke surrendered to police in Hager-
stown, Maryland confessing to Stell's murder. He stated that they had
engaged in consensual sex. They then argued. Stell's murder ensued.
Hoke stated that Stell had taken unfair advantage of him in a drug
deal, so he ransacked her apartment looking to recoup his loss. He
also stated that he had previously pondered killing someone, not
attributable to any provocation.
In addition to having been murdered, the jury found that Stell
had been raped, robbed, and abducted. The jury found that each of
these offenses occurred as an interdependent part of a common
criminal design (murder and rape, murder and robbery, and murder
and abduction). Each of these offenses gave rise to separate capital
imurder counts against the defendant. See, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-
31(l)(4)(5) (1988).
The defendant's appeal raised three issues concerning which no
objection was raised at trial: that the court clerk struck the wrong
venireman pursuant to the defense's fourth peremptory strike, that the
trial court failed to rule on a defense motion for change of venue, and
that Virginia's standard verdict form is constitutionally deficient.
HOLDING
On automatic appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the
findings of fact regarding the three capital murder counts were
supported by the evidence. The rape charge was supported by the
bruised and bound condition of the corpse in addition to the evidence
of sexual activity. The robbery charge was supported by the ransack-
ing of Stell's apartment at or about the time of the murder. The
abduction was supported by Stell's period of survival after the
stabbing and the excessive force involved in binding Stell's body.
The court found that more force was involved in binding S tell than
was necessary to affect a rape.
The court also held that Hoke waived his appeal to the mistakes
in voir dire and change of venue because defense counsel failed to
object to the former and failed to renew its motion for the latter. Also
defense counsel presented no evidence in support of its motion for
change of venue, making harmless any error in failing to rule on the
motion.
Despite defense counsel's failure to object at trial, the court
ruled that the use of Virginia's standard verdict form did not violate
Hoke's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The jury's verdict
incorporated the statutory language of the verdict form. The trial
judge polled the jury. The opinion is silent concerning the scope of
the questions used in polling the jury. Polling could entail at least
three different levels of inquiry. The polling could have inquired
whether each individual juryperson found that the defendant deserved
the death penalty. Polling questions could have asked whether the
juryperson agreed with the verdict as worded in the verdict form.
More precise polling could have inquired into which aggravating
predicate the juryperson found. Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme
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Court held that the jury unanimously found the existence of both
predicates which justify the death penalty (future dangerousness and
vileness) even though only one was necessary to sustain the death
penalty. The court held that the jury's findings of future dangerous-
ness and vileness were supported by the evidence.
The court failed to address the constitutionality of the language
of the verdict form on its face. The wording of the verdict form
leaves open the possibility of the jury unanimously finding either
future dangerousness or vileness, but not unanimously agreeing as to
which predicate exists. The wording of the verdict form also leaves
open the possibility that a jury will unanimously find vileness but fail
to agree on the elements of the vileness: torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to the victim, each of which has been found
independently sufficient to support a death sentence.
ANALYSIS
The importance of Hoke to attorneys in Virginia may be seen in
several different issues. First, Hoke underscores the paramount
importance of preserving issues on the record at trial By failing to
object, the defense waived the right to raise three possibly meritori-
ous issues on appeal. The court preserved the verdict form issue by
ruling on it voluntarily. Defense counsel should be careful not to
summarily forfeit available objections just because the objection will
most probably be overruled, as illustrated by the verdict form issue.
Absent an objection, claims later determined by federal courts to be
meritorious will be lost.
Virginia attorneys should also learn from this case to assess their
cases as objectively as possible. The Virginia capital murder statute
seems to be narrowly drawn. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has construed the statute very broadly. In spite of testimony
of consensual sex followed by homicide, the court found evidence
sufficient to support rape. Hoke's ransacking of Stell's apartment
after murdering her was seen as sufficiently connected to the murder
to support a finding of guilt of murder during commission of robbery
while armed with a deadly weapon, again supporting a capital
conviction. The court also found that there was sufficient force
beyond that inherent in rape to support a conviction of abduction.
These findings should put Virginia defense attorneys on notice that
the capital murder statute will be construed very broadly.
Summary and analysis by: Kerry D. Lee
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFICIENCIES OF VIRGINIA'S "VILENESS" AGGRAVATING FACTOR
By: Juliette A. Falkner
I. As applied In Virginia the vileness predicate in Va. Code Ann.
§19.2-264.2 Is unconstitutional.
For an individual to receive a sentence of death in Virginia, the
jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt the probability that: 1) the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society or; 2) that the
defendant's conduct in committing the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1983). All of these requirements constitute the
"aggravating factors" of Virginia's death penalty scheme. The first
factor is known as the "future dangerousness" predicate. Facially,
future dangerousness is constitutional. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
274, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2957, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (1988) (holding
Texas capital sentencing scheme which allowed a jury to consider
"future dangerousness" was not unconstitutional); Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1983). The second
factor is known as the "vileness" predicate. On its face and as applied
in Virginia the "vileness predicate" in § 19.2-264 is unconstitutional.
See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, .... , 108 S. Ct. 1853,
1859, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372,381 (1988) (unless the trial court communi-
cates a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the meaning of
statutory "vileness factors," the jury's discretion is unguided);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,428, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 398, 406 (1980) (standing alone the words "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" fail to limit the jury's discre-
tion).
The purpose of aggravating factors is twofold under the Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. First, aggravating factors narrow the class of death
eligible defendants in a capital trial. Second, aggravating factors
channel the discretion of the jury to prevent the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty:
[A]n aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the
class of persons elibible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence
on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder....[S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legisla-
tive definition: they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-44,77
L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-250 (1983); see also, Rosen, The "Especially
Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 978-79 (1986) (discussing the
general purpose of aggravating factors). Thus, guiding and limiting
the capital sentencer's discretion "so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action' is a fundamental constitu-
tional requirement. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S. Ct.
2909, 2940-41, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); see also Maynard, 486 U.S.
at_ 108 S. Ct. at 1858. As applied in Virginia, the vileness
predicate in Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 fails to fulfill this constitu-
tional requirement.
In Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. at 420, the judge instructed the
jury that a death sentence could be imposed if the jury found the
offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to
the Victim." Id. at 429. Based on this instruction, the jury sentenced
Godfrey to death. Id. The United States Supreme Court held "there is
nothing in these few words, standing alone that implied any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death
sentence." Id.; see also, Maynard, 486 U.S. at_ 108 S. Ct. at
1853. The Maynard Court found that "especially heinous, atrocious
and cruel" means the same as "outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman" as used in Godfrey. Id. at_ . 108 S. Ct. 1859.
